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JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A JUDGE'S VIEW OF
OUR PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
EDWARD L. THOMPSON*
L Introduction
Juvenile crime is quickly becoming a national epidemic. In the last decade alone
violent juvenile crime rose 27%.2 The statistics in Oklahoma are far worse. From
1983 to 1992, violent crimes committed by Oklahoma's juveniles skyrocketed 262%.'
These crimes committed by juveniles are becoming increasingly brutal and
sophisticated, with incidents of rape, robbery, and murder frequently reported4
Oklahoma's juvenile laws are ill-equipped to deter this increase in juvenile crime.
A recent murder at a local schoolhouse illustrates this point. A fourteen-year-old
student approached a fellow student, drew a gun, and shot him point blank in the
heads Because of Oklahoma's Juvenile Code, this teenager need not fear criminal
prosecution or punishment. Even though the juvenile admitted committing the
murder, he cannot be convicted of any crime nor suffer any punishment.'
Oklahoma's Juvenile Code, at best, allows the judge to assign the juvenile to the
Department of Human Services (DHS). Once assigned, Oklahoma's Juvenile Code
forbids DHS from even punishing him. Moreover, the judge has no authority to order
DHS to incarcerate the juvenile. Instead, the Juvenile Code authorizes his release at
© 1993 Edward L. Thompson
* Associate District Judge, First Judicial District, Harper County, Oklahoma. M.J.S. for Trial Court
Judges, 1991, National Judicial College, University of Nevada, Reno; MJ.S. for Juvenile and Family
Court Judges, 1991, National College of Juvenile and Family Law, National Judicial College, University
of Nevada, Reno; J.D., 1983, University of Oklahoma; B.B.A., 1980, University of Oklahoma.
This is the third in a series of articles by Judge Thompson on juvenile law. The others are Protecting
Abused Children: A Judge's Perspective on Public Law Deprived Child Proceedings and the Impact of
the Indian Child Welfare Acts, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 1 (1990), and Children in Need of Mental Health
Treatment: A Judge's View of Revised Public Law and New Private Law Proceedings, 26 TULSA L.J.
347 (1991) - Ed.
2. Violent Crime Surges: Juveniles' Rate Leaps 27% in Decade, SUNDAY OKLAHOMAN, Aug. 30,
1992, at 1 (stating that the rate of violent juvenile crime rose for all races, social classes, and lifestyles).
3. Juvenile arrests for violent crimes totalled 502 in 1983 and 1317 in 1992. Letter from Hon.
Joseph P. Marak, Jr., Associate District Judge, Woodward County, Okla., to the author (Aug. 27, 1993)
(discussing juvenile crime statistics).
4. Some crimes are so sophisticated and vicious that we have had to invent new words to describe
them such as "carjacklng," "drive-by-shooting," and a particularly sadistic crime known as "wilding."
Here, a pack of juveniles will hunt down a woman, savagely beat, rob and gang-rape her and then leave
her for dead.
5. Mick Hinton, Crime Bill's OK Pleases Victim's Kin, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 9, 1993, at 1.
6. J.J.W. v. State, 842 P.2d 349 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (reversing trial court order certifying
defendant to stand trial as an adult in the district court's criminal division).
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the pleasure of DHS Nith no criminal record; his record is sealed. The juvenile will
soon be back on the street, if he is not there already.
This article addresses the growth in serious, violent crimes by juveniles, and the
Oklahoma Juvenile Ccde's treatment of such crimes: past, present, and future. The
development of juvenile rights, and those rights under Oklahoma's juvenile system,
will be discussed. Next, this article encourages Oklahoma to move beyond the
Juvenile Code's social welfare philosophy to a valid model of justice. This article
concludes by recommending some specific changes to the Oklahoma Juvenile Code.
II. Legal History
The United States Supreme Court once described juvenile court as: "a peculiar
system for juveniles, unknown to our law."7 Ordinarily, persons who committed
crimes at common law were tried, convicted, and punished as criminals. However,
juvenile court did not exist at common law. Exceptions were thus made for infants
and the very young. For example, children under seven were considered incapable
of committing crimes because of their inability to form criminal intent Likewise,
children between seven and fourteen could not be held criminally liable unless the
prosecutor proved the requisite mens rea. Persons fourteen and older, however, were
punished for their crimes.
This common law approach survived well into the nineteenth century. In fact, in
1890, Oklahoma's first territorial legislature adopted the common law approach:
All persons are capable of committing crimes, except those belonging to
the following classes: First. Children under age of seven years. Second.
Children of the age of seven years, but under the age of fourteen years,
in the absence of proof that at the time of committing the act or neglect
charged against them, they knew it [sic] wrongfulness?
Even though Oklahoma statutes adopted the common law approach, young criminals
were not necessarily imprisoned with older, hardened criminals. Instead, the
territorial legislature authorized the court, in its discretion, to place juveniles under
sixteen in a reformatory rather than the territorial prison.'0
At the end of the nineteenth century, a juvenile court movement began in the
United States." The movement rejected the corpus juris and embraced a social
welfare philosophy"a that emphasized rehabilitation rather than punishment of
juvenile offenders. "The child - essentially good, as they see it - is to be made 'to
7. In re Gault, 387 U.. 1, 17 (1967).
8. Id. at 16.
9. OKLA. TERR. STAT. ch. 2, art. 2, § 2 (1890). Because of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Lamb
v. Brown, 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972), Oklahoma reverted back to the common law approach for a
short time. See Schaffer v. Green, 496 P.2d 375 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
10. OKLA. TERR. STAT. ch. 25, art. 59, § 19 (1890); see also the Incorrigible Youth Act, 1895 Okla.
Terr. Sess. Laws ch. 28, §§ 1-13 (granting judges the authority to send criminals under age sixteen to
a reform school rather than prison).
11. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
12. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966).
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feel that he is the object of [the government's] care and solicitude,' not that he is
under arrest or on trial."'' 3 To support their position, the social welfare advocates
contrived a medical model: "the child is to be 'treated' and 'rehabilitated,' and the
procedures, from apprehension through institutionalization, are to be 'clinical' rather
than punitive."'4 The goal is to "diagnose" the child's needs, as a doctor analyzes
a patient's illness.
In determining the disposition to be made of the case the procedure of
the physician is closely followed. * * * The judge and the probation
officer consider (the case) like a physician and his junior ... and then
they address themselves to the question of how permanently to prevent
the recurrence. * * * If the offense is serious and likely to be repeated
... or if the cause of the difficulty is obscure, he is seen by the judge
at frequent intervals, monthly, weekly or sometimes even daily, just as
with the patient and the physician in cases of tuberculosis or typhoid. 6
Illinois became the first state to adopt a social welfare approach to juvenile justice
by establishing a juvenile court in 1899." Oklahoma Territory followed by
establishing a Children's Aid Society in 1905,"8 and in 1909, Oklahoma established
its own juvenile court. 9 The juvenile court, then a division of the county court, had
jurisdiction over any person under sixteen years of age who committed a crime.
Finally, also in 1909, the Oklahoma legislature, expressly adopting the social welfare
philosophy, decriminalized all juvenile crimes by legislative decree. Juvenile
lawbreakers were no longer criminals, but victims entitled to the state's help. "[A]s
far as practicable, any delinquent child shall be treated, not as a criminal, but as
misdirected and misguided, and needing aid, encouragement, help and assistance."'
Today, the social welfare philosophy has radically changed legal practice. Criminal
acts by juveniles are no longer crimes, but rather, euphemistic "causes of action."'"
Juveniles caught in the act of crime cannot be jailed, but only momentarily detained.
Instead, juveniles demand "services"' and receive "treatment."' Even the petition's
13. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
14. Id. at 15-16.
15. Romae Powell, Disposition Concepts, 34 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 1 (1983).
16. HARVEY H. BAKER, PROCEDURE OF THE BOSTON JUVENILE COURT (1910), reprinted in
FREDERIC L. FAUST & PAUL J. BRANTINGHAM, JUVENILE JUSTICE PHILOSOPHY (1978).
17. 1899 Ill. Laws 131; see also Gault, 387 U.S. at 14. While Illinois is credited with enacting the
first statewide juvenile code, the work of Denver Juvenile Court Judge Ben Lindsey and Colorado's
school law, enacted two months before Illinois code, incorporated essentially the same features. See
THOMAS A. JOHNSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM (1975).
18. OKLA. GEN. STAT. ch. 11, §§ 687-698 (1908) (citing 1905 Okla. Terr. Sess. Laws 201). The
Society aided boys under 16 years of age and girls under 15 years of age.
19. OKLA. COMP. LAwS ch. 13, art. I, §§ 594-604 (1909).
20. Id. § 603. Oklahomas Juvenile Code still clings to this social-welfare philosophy. See 10 OKLA.
STAT. § 1129 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
21. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1102(A)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 1115.1.
1993]
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traditional style is altered from the normal "State versus Defendant" to the parens
patriae form of, "In the matter of (juvenile's name)."'  The juvenile is not
considered an accused, but merely a "child."
There are additional differences in the procedure utilized. Criminal charges are
presented merely by filing "petition" rather than by indictment or information.' The
hearing is not considered a trial, but an "adjudicatory hearing."' Juveniles are thus
"adjudicated" rather than convicted of crimes.' Courts are thus unable to impose
judgement and sentence, but only "disposition. ' Most importantly, punishment is
forbidden.
Ill. Juveniles and the Oklahoma Court System
A. Jurisdiction
Juvenile law can be confusing. The precursor requirement of jurisdiction lies at
the heart of this confusion. Does jurisdiction lie in district court? If so, which
division? What about municipal court? The answers to these questions depend on the
accused's age and alleged crime.
Generally, the distrio-t court's juvenile division has jurisdiction over those persons
under age eighteen who are accused of committing crimes. However, there are four
exceptions: traffic offenses, municipal court, certification, and reverse-certification.
Traffic offenses are processed through the district and municipal courts' traffic
divisions, with violations of certain specified municipal ordinances assigned to the
municipal court. Juveniles who commit felonies begin in the juvenile division, but
may be transferred to the adult criminal division in a process called certification.
Sixteen- and seventeen-year-old youths who commit any of the fifteen specified
felonies set out in the statute begin in the adult criminal division, but may be
transferred to the juvenile division in a process called reverse-certification."
B. The Juvenile Division
1. Preliminary Inquiry
Not every juvenile accused of committing a crime ends up in juvenile court. A
screening process known as "preliminary inquiry," or "intake," determines whether
the filing of a petition is necessary. The purpose of a preliminary inquiry is to divert
as many juveniles away from court as possible. A social worker interviews the
juvenile and the juvenile's parents, and then makes an initial determination whether
the juvenile comes within the purview of the Juvenile Code, whether
nonadjudicatory alternatives are available and appropriate, and whether a petition
24. Id. § 1103(B).
25. lId § 1103.
26. Id. § 1101(8);see clso id § 1111(A).
27. Id. § 1114(B).
28. I0 OKLA. STAT. § 1115 (1991); I0 OKLA. STAT. § 1116 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
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should be filed.3 Given the Juvenile Code's philosophy, a juvenile's first crime is
almost certain to be diverted from court. Instead, an informal adjustment will
probably occur, such as deferred prosecution or counseling?' However, if an
informal adjustment is not practicable, a petition is filed.
2. The Petition
At one time in Oklahoma, any reputable person could file a juvenile delinquency
petition. 2 By judicial construction, the county attorney was placed in charge of
prosecuting the case as dominus litis (master of the suit).33 However, in 1968, the
Oklahoma legislature amended the Juvenile Code to expressly limit the role of
private individuals. A private individual was therefore permitted to file a petition
only by leave of court with the county attorney (now district attorney) retaining the
duty to prepare and prosecute the case. Judges were then required to make a
judicial inquiry to determine if action was warranted.35 In 1977, the legislature
eliminated the private individual's right to file a petition altogether. 6 Today, the
district attorney prepares and prosecutes all delinquency petitions.37
Once a petition is filed, the juvenile has the right to know the specifics of the
charge. This right was recognized in the landmark case of In re Gault.8 In Gault,
the United States Supreme Court held that an accused juvenile and his parents have
the right to notice of the charges. Due process thus requires that the juvenile and
his parents "be notified, in writing, of the specific charge or factual allegations to
be considered at the hearing, and that such written notice be given at the earliest
practicable time, and in any event sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit
preparation."39 The right to notice of the charges has been a part of Oklahoma's
Juvenile Code since 1909,' and Oklahoma law has always guaranteed parties time
to prepare for hearings.4! '
30. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(10) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
31. Id. § 1103(A).
32. OKLA. COMp. LAWS ch. 13, art. I, § 596 (1909) (codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103 (1991 &
Supp. 1993)); 10 OKLA. STAT. § 105 (1961).
33. Ex parte Lewis, 188 P.2d 367, 380 (Okla. Crim. App. 1947).
34. 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 282, § 103.
35. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(E) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
36. 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 259, § 3 (codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103(B) (1991 & Supp.
1993)); see also Davis v. Davis, 708 P.2d 1102, 1107 n.23 (Okla. 1985) (describing the related area of
deprived child proceedings).
37. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(E) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
38. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. Id. at 33.
40. OKLA. COMP. LAws ch. 13, art. I, § 596 (1909). Before Oklahoma's adoption of a Juvenile Code
in 1909, juveniles were processed through the criminal justice system, and were entitled to written notice
either by grand jury indictment or prosecutor's information.
41. Id. § 597 (parties provided with a minimum of twenty-four hours notice). Today, the time
granted to prepare for hearings has been doubled. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1105 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
Today, the juvenile and his or her parents have the right to written notice in the petition of: (1) the
specific crime charged; (2) the alleged facts supporting the charge stated with particularity; (3) the list
of witnesses the government intends to call; (4) the relief requested by the government; (5) the juvenile's
1993]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
3. Amendments to the Petition and Subsequent Pleadings
After the juvenile petition is filed, the government cannot amend it, except with
the court's permission.4 ' However, if the court grants an amendment, the parties
are entitled to additional time for preparation to insure a full and fair hearing.43
Because juvenile actions are special statutory proceedings," no pleadings, including
an answer, are required after the petition." Moreover, summary judgment does not
apply, and no motion or pleading can be used to delay the adjudicatory hear-
ing.47 However, if the proof at the adjudicatory hearing does not change the
substance of the alleged act, then the petition is deemed to have been amended to
conform to the proof. Finally, the court cannot change the adjudicatory category
alleged in the prosecutor's petition.4' For example, the court cannot change the
nature of the case from a juvenile delinquency proceeding into one to determine
whether the juvenile is "deprived"'" or "in need of supervision."'"
4. Summons
After the prosecuto- files the petition, a summons is issued." In Oklahoma,
juveniles and their parents have had the right to an issuance of summons since the
adoption of the Juvenile Code in 1909.' The summons should briefly recite the
nature of the juvenile delinquency proceeding, reference the attached petition, and
require the person or persons having custody of the juvenile to accompany the
juvenile to the specified proceeding. It should also state the relief requested and the
right of the juvenile, parents, and other interested parties to be represented by a
lawyer.' The summons is then served on the person having actual custody of the
juvenile.W '5 If the juvenile is twelve or older, a copy must also be served on the
name, age and residence; (6) the names and residences of the juvenile's parents; (7) the name and
residence of the juveniles legal guardian, if any; (8) the name and residence of the person or persons
having custody or control over the juvenile; and (9) if no parent or guardian can be found, then the name
and residence of the nearest lmown relative. Id. § 1103(B). A copy of the juvenile delinquency petition
must be attached to, and delivered with, the summons. Id. § 1103.
42. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103.1(B) (1991).
43. Id.
44. In re Christina T., 590 P.2d 189, 193 (Okla. 1979); see also 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2001 (1991)
including the committee conanent to § 2001.
45. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103.1(A) (1991); see also In re Christina T., 590 P.2d at 192.
46. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103.1(A) (1991); see also In re Christina T., 590 P.2d at 192.
47. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1103.1(A) (1991).
48. Id. § 1103.1(B).
49. Id.
50. See 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(4) (1991 & Supp. 1993) (defining "deprived child").
51. See also id. § 1101(3) (defining a "child in need of supervision").
52. Id § 1104(A).
53. OKLA. COMP. LAws ch. 13, art. 1, § 597 (1909).
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juvenile, with a separate copy served on a custodial parent, guardian, or next
friend.'
5. Arrest Warrant
The district attorney can submit an application to a magistrate for a warrant for
the juvenile's arrest. The application must state facts sufficient to demonstrate
probable cause to believe that the juvenile committed a crimeY" In addition, all
requirements for the issuance of an arrest warrant for an adult offender," including
the identification of the crime charged, must be satisfied.5
9 The magistrate then
determines whether probable cause exists and whether to issue the arrest warrant."
6. Pretrial Detention or Release -
Even if a juvenile is arrested, it is unlikely that he or she will ever be jailed.
Amendments to the Juvenile Code, growing primarily out of the federal lawsuit
known as Terry D.,6 have made it all but impossible to jail a juvenile.
62 In lieu
of jail, a juvenile can be placed in secure juvenile detention. However, even that
seldom happens.
Under Terry D. and Oklahoma's current Juvenile Code, the accused juvenile has
the right to what is known as the "least restrictive alternative," or a presumption of
releasability. This usually means that the juvenile is released to his or her parents
in the hope that the juvenile will return to court at a specified date and time.
3
However, if the prosecutor wants to try and detain the juvenile, then he or she is
taken immediately before a magistrate for a detention hearing. At the detention
hearing, the prosecution must prove that probable cause exists to detain the
juvenile." Even if the prosecutor proves the juvenile probably committed the crime
and that the juvenile should be detained, the juvenile still has the statutory right to
be released on bail.'
56. Id.
57. Id. § 1107(A)(2).
58. Id. § 1104(E).
59. Id.; see also 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1106 (1991) (stating that a warrant may be issued against the
parent, guardian, or the juvenile himself).
60. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1107(A)(2) (1991 & Supp. 1993). It is possible to arrest a juvenile without
a warrant. If a juvenile is caught committing a crime, the juvenile can be arrested by a police officer or
court employee. Id. § 1107(A)(1). The district attorney must then file the juvenile delinquency petition
within five days; otherwise the juvenile must be released to his or her parents. Id. § 1104.1(A). See infra
text accompanying notes 61-69.
61. Terry D. v. Rader, 93 F.R.D. 576 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
62. See 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 342, § 6 (codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1107.1 (D)-(E) (Supp.
1993); 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 205, § 2 (adding a new subsection, § 1107.1(d)(4), for enforcing
detention orders from other states).
63. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1107(B) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
64. Id.; see also id. § 1107.1. Even then, the juvenile can only be detained if it is necessary to
assure the juvenile's appearance in court or for the protection of the juvenile or the public. Id. §
1107.1(A).
65. Id. § 1107(B). The United States Constitution does not guarantee juveniles the right to bail. In
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984), the Supreme Court held that pretrial detention of juveniles
1993]
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If the juvenile fails to make bail, he or she will still likely be prematurely
released as the magistrates order for detention lasts no more than thirty days, and
can only be extended for an additional thirty days if good cause is shown.'
Nevertheless, after ninety days, the juvenile must be released from detention even
if he or she cannot make bail and even if probable cause exists. 7
The Juvenile Code further prohibits the magistrate from placing a juvenile in
secure detention unles3 the prosecutor can prove limited and specific extraordinary
circumstances.' Even then, a secure detention order lasts for no more than ten
days, with extensions granted only if the prosecutor files an additional application.
A secure detention hearing is again conducted, with the juvenile having the right to
be present and to have an attorney at the hearing. Again, the burden is placed on
the prosecutor to prove extraordinary circumstances, and only then is the magistrate
authorized to extend the secure detention order; but the juvenile may be detained
for no more than an additional ten days. Eventually, unless the district attorney files
yet another application starting the process all over again, or at the end of ninety
days, the Juvenile Code requires that the juvenile be released from secure detention.
This circular procedure can lead to bizarre results. For example, in September
1992, a fifteen-year-old boy broke into the home of his ninety-year-old neighbor.
The juvenile burglarized the home, then beat and stabbed the elderly occupant to
death. The police soon caught the juvenile and placed him in secure detention.
However, this detention presented no problem for him as he simply waited out the
ninety days, at which time, by order of the Oklahoma court of Criminal Appeals,
he was released. Seminole County District Attorney Bill Peterson declared the
release to be "unbelievable." Peterson then had the unpleasant duty of telling the
victim's family that the juvenile had been set free. "I told them, 'I'm going to ruin
your Christmas.' They were kind of numb when I told them. Their mouths fell
open. They were dumbfounded."'
is constitutional if due proce;s standards are met. Of course, states can grant juveniles greater protections
than those afforded by the United States Constitution. Oklahoma has done just this by granting juveniles
the right to bail since the original enactment of the Juvenile Code in 1909. OKLA. COMP. LAWS ch. 13,
art. I, § 602 (1909). Today, an accused juvenile has the same right to be released on bail as an adult.
10 OKLA. STAT. § 1107(B) and (C) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
66. 10 OKLA. STAT. 1107.1(A)(1)(a) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
67. Id. § 1107.1(A)(l)(b).
68. Id. § 1107.1(B) and (C).
69. Youth Freed of Clarge, LAWTON CONsT., Dec. 25, 1992, at 12A. The Court of Criminal
Appeals eventually ruled that Mitchel should stand trial as an adult. Stacy D. Johnson, Teen Faces
Murder Trial As Adult After Ruling, SATURDAY OKLAHOMAN & TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at 12. See also
State v. R.W.M., 64 OKLA. B.J. 1299 (1993), which appears to be the Mitchell case. A Seminole County
jury later convicted Mitchell of first-degree murder and first-degree burglary. The jury recommended
Mitchell serve life in prison without parole for killing McGeehee and assessed the maximum 20-year
sentence for the burglary. Jary Recommends Life Term for Teen, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 24, 1993,
at 8. The judge followed the jury's recommendation. Teen Sentenced to Life Term, DAILY OKLAHOMAN,
Nov. 2, 1993, at 5.
[Vol. 46:655
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Z The Adjudicatory Hearing
The adjudicatory hearing must be conducted according to the rules of evidence.'
This is one of the better provisions of the Juvenile Code, ensuring that an adjudica-
tion of delinquency is based on reliable evidence. However, the rules of evidence
do not apply to every stage of juvenile proceedings. For example, the rules do not
apply to the issuance of an arrest warrant, search warrant, as well as to bail
hearings, juvenile emergency show-cause hearings7 or dispositional hearingsO
a) The Right to a Secret Hearing
Generally, the juvenile has the right to a secret hearing.' This right derives from
the Juvenile Code's social welfare philosophy which maintains that the juvenile
should not have his or her crimes exposed to public view because it might hamper
"rehabilitation." But once again, such an approach is too narrow. The public and
press are being barred from vital governmental action - the determination of
whether a citizen has committed a crime. Moreover, an open trial is important to
the preservation of the integrity of the judicial system. The juvenile hearing must
be open so that the public can ensure that all proceedings are fair and regular.
Another problem with secret hearings is that the juvenile can hide past criminal
activity from future prey. For example, if the juvenile is convicted of a violent or
sexually related crime, then at eighteen the juvenile can gain employment at a day
care center, a children's nursery, or any other place where the character of the
applicant is an important consideration, since the crime is not a matter of public
record. Parents and child care providers should not be denied the vital information
necessary to protect innocent children. A better approach is to open all records and
hearings to the public unless the record or specific evidence needs to be closed.
Such closure should only be allowed upon a court order in which the judge must
explain, in writing, the reasons for closure.
Unfortunately, Oklahoma's current Juvenile Code takes an opposite approach.
Hearings are closed unless specifically ordered by the judge to be conducted in
public.74 Only persons having a "direct interbst" in the case are admitted.7 Given
the secrecy surrounding juvenile proceedings, it once appeared that even the
juvenile's victims might be excluded. However, with the emergence of the victim's
rights movement, the 1993 legislature added a provision to the Juvenile Code
requiring that the victim or a relative be notified of all court hearings and be
considered a person having a "direct interest" in the case.76 Unfortunately, the
legislature failed to identify who is responsible for giving the notice. However, the
70. 10 OKLA. STAT. § lII1(A) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
71. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2103(B)(2) (1991).
72. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1115(a) (1991).
73. 10 OKLA. STAT. § IlIl(A)(l) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
74. Id. Second and subsequent offenses are public. Id. § 111 (A)(2).
75. Id. But see Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308, 317 (1977) (stating that
if the press is admitted into a delinquency hearing, the court cannot enjoin publication).
76. 10 OKLA. STAT. § llIl(A)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
19931
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1993
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
district attorney should be required to provide the notice as he or she is required by
law to prepare and prosecute delinquency cases.'
b) Right to a Separate Trial
The juvenile has the right to have his or her case heard separately from the trial
of adults.' From the juvenile's point of view, this is a significant advantage
because it means the juvenile will not stand trial with adult accomplices or adult co-
conspirators. For example, assume two gang members, ages eighteen and fifteen,
stalk, rape, torture, and then stab a young girl to death. The eighteen-year-old,
considered an adult in Oklahoma, will be tried in the district court's criminal
division. If convicted of first degree murder, he will face life imprisonment, life
without parole, or possibly the death penalty. However, the fifteen-year-old will be
tried separately in the juvenile division, where he can plead that he is "just a child."
In all probability he will never face an adult trial, will neither be convicted of any
crime nor punished, and will soon be back on the street. This scenario holds true
even if he is the more vicious and violent murderer. While this is a great bargain
from the juvenile's point of view, it does not serve justice.
Another problem extending from this aspect of the Juvenile Code is that it
focuses narrowly on the welfare of the criminal while ignoring the crime victim.
For example, had the young girl somehow survived, the Code's mandate of separate
trials means the young girl will have to relive the horror over and over again. She
will be forced through a criminal preliminary hearing, possibly a certification
hearing, plus two separate trials. While multiple trials may work to be a strategic
advantage for the juvnile, allowing the defense to drag the victim back to court
over and over again exacts an impermissibly high price on the juvenile.
c) The State Bears the Burden of Proof
In the 1970 case of In re Winship,' the United States Supreme Court held that
the United States Constitution places the burden of proof in juvenile proceedings on
the state.' Oklahoma's Juvenile Code, however, has always placed the burden of
proof on the state in such a situation.8
While it is clear that the state bears the burden of proof in a juvenile proceeding,
the Oklahoma Juvenile Code has never defined what standard of proof is required
for a delinquency adjudication.' This uncertainty was clarified when the United
States Supreme Court decided the issue as a matter of constitutional law. In In re
77. Id. § 1109(E).
78. This right was added to Oklahoma's Juvenile Code by 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 282, § I11.
For the latest version of a juvenile's right to a separate trial, see 10 OKLA. STAT. § 111l(A) (1991 &
Supp. 1993).
79. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
80. Id. at 368.
81. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(E) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
82. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1114(B) (Supp. 1994) (providing that if "the court finds that the allegations
of a petition alleging a child to be delinquent... are supported by the evidence, the court shall sustain
the petition," but not specifying the standard of proof).
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Winship,' the Court held that accused delinquents, like adults, are entitled to a
presumption of innocence.' The juvenile thus has the right to demand that the
government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. "Beyond a reasonable doubt"
is the highest possible standard of proof which is ordinarily not used in other types
of juvenile proceedings. For example, in a deprived child proceeding, the
government need only prove its case by a preponderance of the evidence." And
in a children's mental health case, the government must prove its case by clear and
convincing evidence.'
Consequently, if the government fails to prove delinquency beyond a reasonable
doubt, the judge must dismiss the petition. The juvenile is discharged from all
detention or restriction, with the juvenile's parents also discharged from any
restriction or temporary order.' However, if the government proves its case, the
judge sustains the petition, adjudicates the juvenile "delinquent,"'u and adjudges the
juvenile a ward of the court.'
8. Disposition
If a juvenile delinquent is found guilty of a crime, even a vicious or violent crime
such as rape, armed robbery, or murder, he or she cannot be jailed. The Code
abandons the concept of punishment, instead demanding that an individual service
and treatment plan be filed with the court within thirty days after the juvenile is
adjudged delinquent.' The plan should identify the specific services to be provided
to the delinquent,91 the delinquent's parents, and/or other family members.' Under
the Code, the State becomes the servant of the delinquent and his family. The Code
therefore assumes that delinquents should remain in their own homes - the same
environment that may have spawned their criminal behavior. Any suggestion that
83. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
84. 1l at 368.
85. Edward L. Thompson, Protecting Abused Children: A Judge's Perspective on Public Law
Deprived Child Proceedings and the Impact of the Indian Child Welfare Acts, 15 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
1 (1990). Of course, termination of parental rights under the Indian Child Welfare act requires proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. In re J.W., 742 P.2d 1171, 1175 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
86. Edward L. Thompson, Children in Need of Mental Health Treatment: A Judge's View of Revised
Public Law and New Private Law Proceedings, 26 TuLSA L.J. 347 (1991).
87. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1113 (1991).
88. Rule 8.2 of the Rules for the District Court of Oklahoma, found at 12 OKLA. STAT. ch. 2, app.
(1991), requires that the order adjudicating the juvenile delinquent contain the following findings of fact
and findings of compliance: (1) the delinquent's correct, full legal name; (2) the delinquent's date of
birth; (3) compliance with the Federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (The requirement of compliance
with the Federal ICWA is curious, because the Act itself expressly excludes delinquency proceedings,
see 25 U.S.C. § 1903(I)(iv) (1988) ("Such term or terms shall not include placement based upon an act
which, if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime . . . .")); and (4) compliance with the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA). Although Rule 8.2 still cites the UCCJA as "10 O.S.
1601 et seq.," it was recodified in 1990 and now is found at 43 OKLA. STAT. §§ 501-527 (1991).
89. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1114(B) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
90. Id. § 1115.1(A).
91. Id. § 1115.1(A)(2)(a).
92. Id. § 1115.1(A)(2)(b).
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a delinquent should be removed from his or her home must be explained in
writing."
The court then holds a dispositional hearing' designed to determine what to do
with the juvenile criminal. The dispositional hearing is heard by a judge rather than
a jury, and strict rules. of evidence do not apply. Instead, all evidence helpful in
reaching a disposition which will best serve the interest of the juvenile criminal and
the public is admissible. Such evidence includes oral and written reports." Of
course, the judge must advise parties and counsel of the factual contents and
conclusions of all reports, affording a fair opportunity to controvert them."
a) Disposition Orders
The Code limits the court in the types of dispositional orders it can issue.' As
previously discussed, the court cannot sentence a delinquent to jail, even for
atrocious crimes, as the Code and its underlying philosophy decriminalizes all
juvenile behavior. In fact, the court's first option is simply to send the delinquent
home on "probation.""3 The hope is "rehabilitation"; that the delinquent will stop
committing crimes once he or she gets services and treatment.
The second option is to place the delinquent with a private institution or
agency." However, a private institution or agency may not be willing to accept the
delinquent. Moreover, as with own-home placement, there is no practical way to
prevent the delinquent, if he or she desires, from committing more crimes.
Third, the court may order the delinquent to receive counseling or other
community-based services."° Again, because the delinquent is not in a secure
facility, the judge is reduced to hoping that the delinquent will commit no further
crimes.
Fourth, the court may commit the delinquent to the custody of the DHS.0 '
However, at that point, the DHS decides where to place the delinquent and for how
long. As a practical matter, the DHS will probably not place the delinquent in a
secure institution, primarily because of a 1978 lawsuit filed against the state of
Oklahoma for the mishandling of juveniles. The lawsuit, now known as Terry
D., ~ resulted in a 1984 consent decree" and federal monitoring over Oklahoma,
which still continues. The practical effect was deinstitutionalization, as Oklahoma
93. Id. § 1115.1(A)(3).
94. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1115 (1991); see also 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(9) (1991 & Supp. 1993)
(defining dispositional hearing as "a hearing to determine the order of disposition which shall be made
with respect to a child adjudged to be a ward of the court").
95. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1115(a) (1991).
96. Id. § 1115(b).
97. All disposition orlers must be reviewed by the court every six months. 10 OKLA. STAT. §
1116.1 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
98. Id § 1116(A)(1).
99. Id. § 1116(A)(2).
100. Id. § 1116(A)(3).
101. Id. § 1116(A)(4).
102. Terry D. v. Rader, 93 F.R.D. 576 (W.D. Okla. 1982).
103. Id. (consent decree filed May 31, 1984).
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soon closed virtually all its secure juvenile institutions. Today, the DHS has only
201 secure placement beds, 4 many of which are only for temporary placement
of 30, 60, or 90 days. Moreover, because these few secure placements are usually
full, the DHS must usually place delinquents in nonsecure settings, hoping that they
will commit no additional crimes.
Fifth, if the juvenile is placed outside the home, the court may make the
juvenile's parents and household members subject to a treatment or placement plan
if they contributed to the juvenile's delinquency."
Sixth, the court may order the delinquent to pay a victim's compensation
assessment, perform community service, or pay a fine. The court has further
authority to revoke the delinquent's driver's license, sanction detention in the
delinquent's own home, with DHS, or a juvenile bureau, impose weekend detention,
tracking, or house arrest with electronic monitoring, or impose sanctions for
violating probation."4 The delinquent, his parents, or both, may also be ordered
to reimburse the court fund. If the parent willfully fails to pay, the parent may be
held in contempt of court. 7
Seventh, the court may dismiss the case for good cause shown.'
b) The "Reasonable Efforts" Requirement
Every dispositional order removing a delinquent from his or her home must
contain a court finding that "reasonable efforts have been made to provide for the
return of the child to the child's own home, or that efforts to reunite the family are
not feasible, and reasonable efforts are being made to secure an alternate place-
ment.","
C. Additional Guaranteed Rights
1. The Right To Remain Silent
The juvenile's right to remain silent is protected by both the United States
Constitution and state law. The United States Supreme Court extended the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination to juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings in In re Gault,"' stating "the constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles as it is with respect to
adults."' Oklahoma's Juvenile Code provides that the juvenile "may remain silent
104. Central Oklahoma Juvenile Center has 38 beds. L.E. Rader Center has 163 beds (Diagnostic
Center, 15; New Start, 32; R.T.P., 60; and IJ.P., 56). Telephone Interview with Dan Broughton,
Programs Administrator, Office of Juvenile Justice, Okla. Dep't of Human Servs. (Aug. 30, 1993); Okla.
Dep't of Human Servs., Annual Report for FY '93 (1993) (on file with the Oklahoma Law Review).
105. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1116(A)(5) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
106. Id.; see also id. § 1116(A)(6)(a)-(g).
107. Id. § 1116(E). Parents can also be held liable for the care and maintenance of their child. 10
OKLA. STAT. § 1121 (1991).
108. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1116(A)(7) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
109. Id. § 1116(A)(8).
110. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
111. 1& at 55.
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as a matter of right in delinquency hearings... and before he is interrogated he
shall be so advised.""
2
Oklahoma's response to Gault was not simply to incorporate this constitutional
privilege, but to shift the balance to the side of the juvenile against law enforce-
ment. This partiality is evidenced by the restrictions placed on the questioning of
children by law enforcement officers."' A juvenile cannot be questioned unless
his or her parents, guardian, legal custodian, or lawyer is present. Moreover, before
questioning begins, both the juvenile and the juvenile's parents, guardian, or
custodian must be "fully advised of the constitutional and legal rights" of the
juvenile, including the right to be represented by a lawyer at every stage of the
proceedings, and the right to a court-appointed lawyer if the juvenile is an
indigent."' Unfortunately, the legislature gave no further explanation of what it
meant by "constitutional and legal rights" before questioning. However, it probably
refers to the familiar Miranda"' warnings routinely administered by police to
criminal suspects before custodial questioning. These restrictions on the questioning
of juveniles extend not only to police, but also to DHS personnel, court employees,
and investigative agencies."6
The right to remain silent is especially important in juvenile delinquency
proceedings and should be retained. Because adolescence can be a time of great
instability, a juvenile, under stress, may falsely acknowledge guilt. Moreover, a
juvenile may succumb to the fear or panic associated with a delinquency proceed-
ing. Therefore, without appropriate safeguards, the juvenile's admissions or
confessions may not be trustworthy."7
Finally, there are limits to how far our government can go. The Constitution and
Juvenile Code thus prevent the government, "whether by force or by psychological
domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation
and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing
his conviction..". Great care must be taken to assure that any statement made by
an accused juvenile is voluntary, not only in the sense that it is not forced, coerced,
112. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1111(B) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
113. 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 282, § 109 (codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(A) (1991 & Supp.
1993).
114. 10 OKLA. STAT. 1 1109(A) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
115. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
116. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(A) (1991 & Supp. 1993). One consequence of failing to follow the
restrictions on questioning is that any information gained is not admissible. The "fruit of the poisonous
tree' doctrine may also be applicable, rendering any evidence later obtained as a result of the tainted
statement inadmissible. Id.; see also R.S. v. State, No. J-89-1329 (Okla. Crim. App. June 8, 1991);
K.J.M. v. State, 811 P.2d 103 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); Young v. State, 807 P.2d 276 (Okla. Crim. App.
1991); Williams v. State, 807 P.2d 271 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991); R.W.D. v. State, No. J-90-0078 (Okla.
Crim. App. Jan. 8, 1991); State v. S.J.A., No. J-90-343 (Okla. Crim. App. Aug. 7, 1990); Harris v. State,
777 P.2d 1359 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
117. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) (reversing conviction in adult criminal court of 15-year-old
boy for murder); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967) (extending privilege to juvenile delinquency
proceedings).
118. Gault, 387 U.S. t 47.
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or suggested, but also that it is "not the product of ignorance of rights or of
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair."'1 9
2. Right to a Lawyer
As mentioned previously," a juvenile must be informed of his or her right to
an attorney before that juvenile can be questioned. This right to an attorney also
extends to all aspects of a juvenile proceeding. The juvenile's right to an attorney
was explained in In re Gault,' where the United States Supreme Court held that
the accused juvenile, as well as his or her parents, must be notified of the juvenile's
right to be represented by an attorney. Moreover, if the juvenile is an indigent, he
or she has the right to a court-appointed attorney." The Court declared that this
right to representation, which springs from the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, mandates that there be "the guiding hand of counsel at every step
in the proceedings."'" The Court thus demonstrated its belief that a lawyer can
help the juvenile cope with the problems of law by skillfully inquiring into the facts,
insisting on regular proceedings, determining whether the accused has a defense,
and preparing and submitting the juvenile's case." It should be noted that the
juvenile's right to a lawyer is also specifically guaranteed by Oklahoma law." In
fact, the Juvenile Code expressly forbids parents from attempting to "waive" the
juvenile's right to a lawyer."
3. Right to a Jury Trial
In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,7 the United States Supreme Court held that the
Due Process Clause does not grant juveniles the right to trial by jury at the
adjudicatory phase of a juvenile delinquency proceeding." However, states are
free to grant their citizens greater protection than that afforded under the United
States Constitution. In fact, in the words of Oklahoma's Court of Criminal Appeals,
this state is one of the few states which provides "greater safeguards for the rights
of juveniles than are required by the United States Constitution."'2 9
Oklahoma has been granting juveniles the right to trial by jury since 1909.30
Significantly, Oklahoma considers the juvenile's right to trial by jury so important
that, for a time, the right was even added to the Oklahoma Constitution.' Today,
119. Id. at 55.
120. See supra note 114.
121. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
122. Id. at 41.
123. Id. at 36 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
124. Id.
125. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(A) and (B) (1991 & Supp. 1993); see also 10 OKLA. STAT. § 24
(1991).
126. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1109(B) (1991 & Supp. 1993). Moreover, although not required by federal
law, the juvenile has a right to a guardian ad litem under the Juvenile Code. Il § I109(C).
127. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
128. Id. at 551.
129. Alford v. Carter, 504 P.2d 436, 439 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
130. OKLA. Comp. LAWS ch. 13, art. I, § 595 (1909).
131. Thejuvenile's right to ajury trial was added to Oklahoma's Constitution by State Question No.
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the right to a jury trial at an adjudicatory hearing to determine whether the juvenile
is delinquent still survives in the Juvenile Code.' However, it applies only to the
adjudicatory phase, and not to disposition, which is heard by the court.
4. Right to a Transcript
In In re Gault,' the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to address
the issue of whether the Due Process clause requires that a transcript of the
delinquency proceedings be provided to the juvenile. However, even if a transcript
is not constitutionally required, Oklahoma law provides that stenographic notes or
a transcript shall be kept."M This is a sound provision as a record of the proceed-
ings protects everyone, while facilitating meaningful appellate review.
Nevertheless, a problem remains. The Juvenile Code provides that the transcript
is secret and should not be open to public inspection without court order.'35 This
,law should be changed. The public has a right to know what its government is
doing. To strike a better balance between the juvenile's right to privacy and the
public's right to know, the law should provide that all hearings and transcripts are
open to public inspection, except where the court, for good cause shown, closes a
specific part of a hearing or portion of a transcript. Even then, the judge should be
required to explain, in writing, the reasons for closure.1
6
5. Right to Credible Testimony
The United States Constitution and the Oklahoma Juvenile Code also guarantee
the juvenile that all testimony at the adjudicatory hearing will be sworn under
oath. Again, this increases the reliability of the adjudication. The United States
Constitution and the Oklahoma Juvenile Code also guarantee the juvenile the right
to confront his or her accusers. 3 Finally, the United States Constitution and the
Oklahoma Juvenile Code guarantee the juvenile the right to cross-examine his
accusers.'39 The right to cross-examine is perhaps the most important tool in the
search for truth.
6. Delinquents Retain Their Civil Rights
Under Oklahoma's Juvenile Code, even delinquents convicted of serious crimes
retain their civil rights. Convictions for crimes committed under the Juvenile Code
do not count against the juvenile for purposes of "employment, civil rights, or any
459, Legislative Referendum No. 172, adopted at election held September 17, 1968, effective Jan. 13,
1969. The right was deleted from Oklahoma's Constitution by State Question No. 623, Legislative
Referendum No. 277, adopted at election held on Aug. 28, 1990.
132. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1110 (1991 & Supp. 1993). The jury consists of six persons.
133. 387 U.S. 1, 58 (1967).
134. 10 OKLA. STAT. § III (A)(1) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
135. td.
136. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
137. Gault, 387 U.S. at 57; 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1111(C) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
138. Gault, 387 U.S. at 42; 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1111(C) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
139. Gault. 387 U.S. at 57; 10 OKLA. STAT. § IIII(C) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
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statute, regulation, license, questionnaire, application, or any other public or private
purposes."'" Once again, under the social welfare theory, juveniles who kill, rape,
and maim are not criminals but simply misguided youths. Under such a philosophy,
it is not helpful to their rehabilitation to be labeled as criminals, or even for the public
to know of their crimes. Unfortunately such a naive philosophy gives predators just
the chance they need to attack new victims.'
D. The Municipal Court Exception
In the wake of an unmanageable increase of juvenile felony cases, the Oklahoma
legislature, in 1989, created the municipal court exception. During this period of
increasing crime, juvenile division judges, prosecutors, and public defenders were
swamped with juvenile felony cases, leaving little time and resources to address
misdemeanors. The legislature therefore authorized the governing bodies of
municipalities to enter into agreements with the district court, allowing the municipal
court to assume jurisdiction over juveniles who commit the crimes of vandalism,
shoplifting, or public intoxication." While juveniles convicted in a municipal court
can be required to pay a fine, perform community service work, receive counseling,
or complete other community based services, the legislature still forbids municipalities
from imposing jail time as punishment. The legislature still, however, requires that
juveniles' crimes be hidden from public view."
Over the years, the legislature has added numerous additional misdemeanors to
those overseen in the municipal courts. There are now twelve: vandalism, shoplifting,
trespassing, assault, battery, assault and battery, truancy, curfews, possession of 3.2
beer, possession of alcoholic beverages, disorderly conduct, and public intoxica-
tion.
45
E. The Traffic Exception
The legislature created a traffic exception to juvenile jurisdiction in 1968." Under
this exception, routine violations are processed through the district and municipal
140. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1125.4 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
141. For example, assume that a juvenile has been detained for raping and sodomizing young
children. Assume further that, under the Juvenile Code, the juvenile is adjudicated delinquent. When the
juvenile turns eighteen, he or she seeks employment where there is easy access to children: as a day-care
worker, maintenance crew of a children's hospital or public school, etc. The employer is very careful,
and specifically asks whether the applicant is a convicted child molester. The applicant responded with
a smile, knowing that the Juvenile Code says none of his actions are crimes and that all his juvenile
records are sealed. He will be on the job tomorrow, waiting for the children. Id.
142. 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 269, § 1.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1102(E) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
146. 1968 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 252, §§ 101, 112. The most recent version is 1993 Oklq. Sess. Laws
ch. 342, § I (codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1101(2)(a) (1991 & Supp. 1993)) and 1993 Okla. Sess.
Laws ch. 342, § 7 (codified at 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1112(A) (1991 & Supp. 1993). See also Shirley A.
Cox, Juvenile Law: Jurisdiction of Juveniles in Driving Under the Influence Cases, 33 OKLA. L. REy.
399 (1980).
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courts' criminal divisions. Only juveniles who habitually violate traffic laws are
subject to juvenile division jurisdiction. 7
The theory behind the traffic exception is straightforward: the Juvenile Code's social
welfare philosophy simply does not apply to a minor traffic offense."4 Because
traffic violations are generally noncriminal in nature, the stigma of criminality does
not attach to a traffic ticket; 49 such violations are merely malum prohibitum rather
than malum in se.5" Branding an errant driver delinquent and subjecting him or her
to the same range of disposition as one who committed a very serious crime makes
no sense.'
5'
While the traffic exception usually works well, there are some trouble areas that
should be noted. For instance, what about the juvenile who drives recklessly, drives
drunk, or commits vehicular negligent homicide? Unfortunately, the legislature has
never defined what crimes are included in the traffic exception, so it has been up to
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to sort out which crimes fall under this
exception.
In Mook v. City of Tulsa," the court held that reckless driving falls within the
traffic exception." Mook, age sixteen, was charged in Tulsa Municipal Court with
violating the city ordinance against reckless driving. The jury convicted the juvenile
and fixed his punishment at sixty days in jail and a twenty-five-dollar fine. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction and fine, but vacated
Mook's incarceration," The court held that even though the municipal court had
jurisdiction to convict and fine Mook, it could not sentence a juvenile to jail without
a certification proceeding"s
The court ruled the same way in Franshier v. City of Oklahoma City." Franshier,
age seventeen, was charged in Oklahoma City Municipal Court with driving under the
influence of alcohol. The penalty for drunk driving under the city ordinance is a fine,
imprisonment, or both. However, the municipal judge, relying on Mook, instructed the
jury that the only punishment for a juvenile was a fine. Upon conviction, Franshier
was fined. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, stating: "[Tihe juvenile
act compels the conclusion that no child be sentenced to incarceration in a criminal
action in the absence of certification proceedings."'"
The conclusion drawn from these cases is that reckless driving, DUI, and DUlI's
lesser included offenses are all traffic in nature. The juvenile will thus be tried as an
147. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1101(2) (1991 & Supp. 1993). But compare State v. Gray, 803 P.2d 718,
720 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990) (erroneously referring to the traffic exception as the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction).




152. 565 P.2d 1065 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
153. Id. at 1067.
154. Id. at 1068.
155. Id. at 1067.
156. 620 P.2d 1347 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
157. Id. at 1349.
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adult in the district court's criminal division or municipal court, and if found guilty,
the judgment and sentence is an adult criminal conviction, rather than a juvenile
adjudication. However, the juvenile still cannot face jail time as a penalty."
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has also decided whether vehicular
negligent homicide falls within the traffic exception." In D.M.T. v. Edmiston,"
the court held that negligent homicide is not a traffic violation, and thus the district
court's criminal division has no jurisdiction. 1' A juvenile accused of committing
negligent homicide can therefore only be processed through the juvenile division.
This ruling creates a serious problem as the Juvenile Code forbids juvenile division
judges from jailing criminals - even those who kill. Further, because the statutory
punishment for negligent homicide is not more than one year in the county jail,"
the crime is not a felony. Therefore, the judge can neither certify the juvenile as an
adult, nor transfer the case to the district court's criminal division. In other words, a
juvenile can drive with reckless disregard for the safety of others, crash into another
car and kill the driver, but he or she cannot spend a single day in jail or be convicted
of any crime.
Unfortunately, this is not just a legal theory, but a tragic fact. For example, on June
12, 1993, a seventeen-year-old was driving at 75 mph in a 45 mph zone. The teenager
sped through an Edmond intersection and smashed into the broadside of a car, killing
the driver. Prior to the accident, the teenager had already received ten traffic
citations." Moreover, during the pendency of his juvenile case for negligent
homicide,"1 he was cited four more times for traffic violations." The teenager
eventually admitted his delinquency, and the juvenile court judge ordered him not to
drive. Nevertheless, the delinquent violated the court's order by driving the next




Certification is the process by which ajuvenile charged with a crime can be ordered
to stand trial as an adult." If the juvenile is certified, the case is transferred from
158. State v. Gray, 803 P.2d 718, 721 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990). Of course, if the juvenile continues
to drive drunk after he or she becomes an adult, his or her prior drunk driving convictions incurred while
ajuvenile can be used to enhance punishment. A repeat offender faces felony prosecution and up to five
years imprisonment.
159. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 11-903 (1991) (Motor Vehicles Code).
160. 560 P.2d 976 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977).
161. Id. at 978.
162. 47 OKLA. STAT. § 11-903(b) (1991).
163. Penny Owen, Edmond Teen Faces Contempt of Court Trial, SATURDAY OKLAHOMAN & TIMES,
Oct. 30, 1993, at 12.
164. In re C.S.D., No. JF-93-1311 (Dist. Ct. Okla. County, Okla.).
165. Owen, supra note 163, at 12.
166. Id.
167. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1112(B) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
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the district court's juvenile division to the criminal division. If convicted, the
juvenile is adjudged a criminal and is sentenced and punished as an adult. The
Juvenile Code has contained a certification provision since the Code's first adoption
in 1909." Certification was supposed to serve as the Juvenile Code's safety valve,
however, changes over the years have perverted the safety valve into the juvenile's
license to kill.
The Code's original certification provision was simple and straightforward: "The
court may, however, in its discretion cause such child to be proceeded against in
accordance with the laws that may be in force governing the commission of
crime."" However, in 1966, the United State Supreme Court decision of Kent v.
United States"' imposed the basic due process requirements on state certification
proceedings. These include: the right to a hearing; the right to a lawyer; the right
of the juvenile's lawyer to have access to the juvenile's social records and probation
and other similar reports; and the right to a statement of reasons for the court's
decision.'
The application of these due process requirements to the Code's certification
proceedings presented no major problems; however, the Court unfortunately
mentioned in passing eight guidelines promulgated by the judge of the District of
Columbia's juvenile court on November 30, 1959." These guidelines, which were
later rescinded, identified eight factors that the D.C. juvenile court once considered
in deciding whether to certify a juvenile as an adult." The guidelines provided,
in relevant part:
The determinative factors which will be considered by the Judge in
deciding whether the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction over such offenses
will be waived are the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and
whether the protection of the community requires waiver.
2. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner.
3. Whether the alleged offense was against person or against
property, greater weight being given to offenses against persons
especially if personal injury resulted.
4. The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is
evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an
indictment (to be determined by consultation with the United States
Attorney).
168. OKLA. COMP. LAws ch. 13, art. I, § 601 (1909).
169. Id.
170. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
171. Id. at 554.
172. Id. at 546 nA.
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5. The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one
court when the juvenile's associates in the alleged offense are adults
who will be charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia.
6. The sophistication and maturity of the Juvenile as determined by
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional attitude
and pattern of living.
7. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous
contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement agencies,
juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation to the
Court, or prior commitments of juvenile institutions.
8. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found to
have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, services
and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court. 74
It is crucial to recognize that these guidelines are not the holding of Kent. The
U.S. Supreme Court did not impose these guidelines on the states. Unfortunately,
however, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, in Sherfield v. State,75
misread Kent to impose the guidelines on Oklahoma. And once again, in S.H. v.
State,76 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals claimed the guidelines "were
mandated by the United States Supreme Court case of Kent.'"
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals did not recognize its error until State
ex rel. Coats v. Rakestraw, where the court finally conceded that Kent did not
mandate the District of Columbia guidelines: "Our statement in S.H. v. State relied
on by respondent, to wit: 'The guidelines set out in Sherfield, supra, were mandated
by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Kent v. United States,' was
dictum not supported by Kent, and we expressly overrule it.""' Dictum or not, the
Oklahoma court of Criminal Appeals apparently forgot what it said in Rakestraw,
because, in its 1984 decision in K.C.H. v. State," the Court once again claimed
that the District of Columbia guidelines were mandated by Kent."'
The Oklahoma legislature also had difficulty with Kent, as was exemplified by
the fact that the same year that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals decided
Sherfield, the legislature amended the Juvenile Code to add the guidelines." An
174. Id. at 565.
175. 511 P.2d 598 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973).
176. 555 P.2d 1050 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
177. Id. at 1052.
178. 610 P.2d 256 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
179. Id. at 258 n.1 (citations omitted) (quoting Sherfield v. State, 511 P.2d 598, 600 (1973)).
180. 674 P.2d 551 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
181. Id. at 552.
182. 1973 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 227, § 1.
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amendment passed in 1977 compacted the original eight guidelines into five,'" and
added a new sixth guideline addressing offenses occurring during escape."'
The certification process that was so simple in 1909 is today rather complex.
Section 1112 of the Juvenile Code, which now controls the certification process, has
several important provisions." First, no juvenile can be certified unless the crime
he or she commits is a felony." The felony requirement sounds reasonable
enough, but it excludes serious criminal behavior. For example, it permits juveniles
who commit vehicular homicide to escape all criminal punishment."' Therefore,
as vehicular homicide, is not a felony, juveniles cannot be certified to stand trial as
adults. Consequently, these juveniles who kill will never face criminal liability.
The next problem with certification is the cryptic language used by the legislature
to describe under which circumstances certification proceedings must be held. The
statute reads: "Except as otherwise provided by law, if a child is charged with
delinquency as the result of an offense which would be a felony if committed by
an adult, the court on its own motion or at the request of the district attorney, shall
conduct [certification proceedings.]""M This language can be read in at least two
ways: (1) certification proceedings must be held whenever a juvenile is charged
with a felony; or (2) certification proceedings are never held unless specifically
demanded by the district attorney or the judge. It appears that the accepted practice
in Oklahoma is the latter, which can place the judge in an untenable position.
Assume a fifteen-year-old is charged with breaking into a woman's home and
beating her to death, but the district attorney does not file for certification. If the
court initiates certification proceedings "on its own motion" as authorized by statute,
then the judge is likely to be criticized for trying to be both prosecutor and judge.
The judge might also be attacked by a claim of prejudging the case for even
considering certification. A judge must also address the practical problem of how
to hold an effective certification hearing if none of the parties favor certification.
For instance, will the judge be placed in the unseemly position of subpoenaing the
court's, rather than a party's witnesses? Will the court be required to interrogate
witnesses?
Bruner v. Myers" is the only reported case in which a trial judge, on his own
motion, certified a juvenile to stand trial as an adult. In this case, the juvenile filed
an original proceeding in the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of
prohibition. Although the Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the judge's
statutory right to hold certification proceedings on its own motion, it granted the
183. 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 79, § 2; see also State ex reL Bums v. Steely, 600 P.2d 367, 370
n.7 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
184. 1979 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 257, § 4.
185. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1112 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
186. Id. § 1112(B).
187. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text discussing that vehicular homicide does not
fall within the "traffic exception" to the juvenile code.
188. See supra notes 159-66.
189. 532 P.2d 458 (Okda. Crim. App. 1975).
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writ anyway. The Myer court instead held that because the trial judge did not give
the parties sufficient notice, the certification proceeding was improper."
2. The Certification Process
Assuming that the juvenile is charged with a felony, and that certification
proceedings are properly brought by the district attorney or judge, the certification
process consists of two hearings: (1) the prosecutive merit hearing, and (2) the
amenability of rehabilitation hearing.
a) The Prosecutive Merit Hearing
The purpose of the prosecutive merit hearing is to determine the sufficiency of
the evidence against the juvenile, and is held by a judge sitting without a jury.
While the prosecutor bears the burden of proof, at this early stage of the proceed-
ings, the standard of proof necessary to satisfy the statutory requirement of
prosecutive merit is relatively low.191 The prosecutor must only prove a "reason-
able likelihood" that the juvenile committed the crime" which is "something less
than the 'probable cause' standard applied at a criminal preliminary examina-
tion.
1 93
If the prosecutor fails to prove prosecutive merit, the juvenile cannot be certified.
However, if the judge finds prosecutive merit, the case is continued to allow for an
investigation and a further hearing in order to determine the juvenile's amenability
to rehabilitation in the juvenile system."
b) The Amenability to Rehabilitation Hearing
In order to understand an amenability hearing, one must return to the Juvenile
Code's social welfare philosophy. This philosophy assumes that even prosecutive
merit juveniles have the right to rehabilitative treatment in the juvenile system. The
burden to prove otherwise is on the State; a negative burden which is almost
impossible to overcome.'95
Under Oklahoma's Juvenile Code, certifying a juvenile to stand trial as an adult
thus "contemplates the exceptional case in which the child is not amenable to
treatment under the juvenile facilities and programs available to the court."'"
However, a finding that the juvenile is unfit for rehabilitation "is a discretionary
decision to be made by the judge, but the decision must be based on substantial
evidence against the juvenile's claim to the benefit of juvenile treatment."' 9
190. d. at 462.
191. K.V.F. v. State, 805 P.2d 106, 108 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
192. M.L.S. v. State, 805 P.2d 665, 667 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991).
193. Id. (quoting and adopting Judge Lane's separate opinion in R.J.D. v. State, 799 P.2d 1122
(Okla. Crim. App. 1990)).
194. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1112(B) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
195. In re J.E.S., 585 P.2d 382, 383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
196., T.C. v. State, 740 P.2d 739, 742 (Okla. Crin. App. 1987) (quoting with approval J.T.P. v.
State, 544 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975)).
197. Id. (quoting with approval In re E.O., 703 P.2d 192 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985)). The Court of
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In addition, section 1112(B) identifies six guidelines the judge must consider in
determining the prospects for rehabilitation:
Consideration shall be given to:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community, and
whether tfe alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner;
2. Whether the offense was against persons or property, greater
weight being given to offenses against persons especially if personal
injury resulted;
3. The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile and his capability
of distinguishing right from wrong as determined by consideration of his
psychological evaluation, home, environmental situation, emotional
attitude and pattern of living;
4. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous
contacts with community agencies, law enforcement agencies, schools,
juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation or
prior commitments to juvenile institutions;
5. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile if he is found to
have committed the alleged offense, by the use of procedures and
facilities currently available to the juvenile court; and
6. Whether fte offense occurred while the juvenile was escaping or
in an escape status from an institution for delinquent childrenY'
Even with these guidelines, one would assume that a juvenile committing cruel
and atrocious crimes such as armed robbery, rape, or murder would certainly be
certified. Such an assumption is wrong. Under Oklahoma's Juvenile Code, "there
is no presumption that a child who has committed a very serious act is not receptive
to rehabilitative treatment."'" The Juvenile Code's obsession with social engineer-
ing, coupled with its rejection of criminal accountability, persists despite the fact
that the trial judge's consideration of the guidelines does not have to be arithmeti-
cally proportioned among the six factors.' Moreover, there is no requirement that
each factor has to be ulearly decided against the juvenile."' The Oklahoma Court
Criminal Appeals defines substantial evidence as follows:
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla. It must do more than create a suspicion
of the existence of the fact to be established. We must consider the case as a whole and
not piecemeal. The lines of proof must be considered together, not separately. Even if
each line of proof tal:en by itself is of insufficient probative force, the conclusion does not
necessarily follow that the proof taken as a whole is insufficient. The lines of proof
interweave and support each other.
M.L.S. v. State, 805 P.2d 665, 669 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (quoting with approval Corbin v. United
States, 253 P.2d 646, 649 (10th Cir. 1958)).
198. 10 OKLA. STAT. 1: 1112(B) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
199. T.C., 740 P.2d at 742 (quoting S.H. v. State, 581 P.2d 916, 917 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
200. K.C.H. v. State, 674 P.2d 551, 552 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
201. J.T.P. v. State, 544 P.2d 1270, 1279 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
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of Criminal Appeals will therefore vacate certifications even in instances where the
juvenile has committed a serious crime.a
For example, in T.C. v. State," a juvenile and his girlfriend broke into a
seventy-five-year-old man's house and began to rob him. Upon waking the man, the
juveniles began beating him with a board. The juvenile's vicious attack inflicted
horrible injuries, including multiple wounds to the man's skull and brain, twelve
smashed ribs, a fractured sternum, two broken wrists, a broken ankle, and multiple
body lacerations and bruises. These injuries led to the elderly man's death.
The trial judge certified the juvenile to stand trial as an adult, but the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the certification. In its chilling opinion, the court
stated: "The fact that the appellant is accused of brutally beating an elderly man to
death does not in and of itself answer the question of whether the appellant is
amenable to rehabilitation with the juvenile system."' Given the prosecutor's
nearly impossible burden of proving a negative, certification may mean that a
juvenile's first violent crime, even murder, is free.' 5
G. Reverse Certification
By the 1970s, the public became so disillusioned with the Juvenile Code's social
welfare philosophy that it demanded that violent juveniles be held accountable for
their crimes. Finally, a bill was introduced in 1978 and the Legislative debate was
on. The Honorable Tom R. Cornish, who was at that time a judge on the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals, described the action:
The atmosphere surrounding the adoption of the legislation in 1978 was
one in which many thought there was undue coddling of juvenile
offenders. Correspondingly, a popular goal was to enact a procedure
that would deal swiftly and harshly with the sophisticated juvenile.
There was a groundswell of support for lowering the age of accountabil-
ity from eighteen to sixteen for all juveniles - a proposal for which
support is still apparent. There was even debate about dropping the age
to fourteen.2
Eventually, a compromise was reached. The juvenile age remained at eighteen, but
an exception was carved out for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds charged with
202. J.J.W. v. State, 842 P.2d 349 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); M.L.S. v. State, 805 P.2d 665 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1991); T.C. v. State, 740 P.2d 739 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); In re E.O., 703 P.2d 192 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1985); S.H. v. State, 581 P.2d 916 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); In re G.L.W., 580 P.2d 998
(Okla. Crim. App. 1978); C.P. v. State, 562 P.2d 939 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977); In re R.M., 561 P.2d 572
(Okla. Crim. App. 1977); In re J.S., 556 P.2d 641 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
203. 740 P.2d 739 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); see also Williams v. State, 807 P.2d 271 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1991).
204. T.C., 740 P.2d at 742.
205. Free, that is, from criminal prosecution and punishment. The juvenile might still have to pass
through the juvenile system, but that results in no criminal trial, no conviction, no criminal record, and
by definition, -no punishment.
206. Tom R. Cornish, Where Have All the Children Gone? - Reverse Certification, 35 OKLA. L.
REv. 373, 374 (1982).
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committing any of eleven specified crimes. If a juvenile was charged with one
of these "exception" or "index" crimes, he or she would be considered an adult,
subject to criminal prosecution, trial, and punishment. The legislature thus placed
the burden on the accused to convince the magistrate that he or she should be
certified as "child" and remanded to the juvenile division - hence the name
"reverse certification."
The original reverse certification law did not last long. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals immediately struck it down as unconstitutionally vague.'
However, in doing so, a member of the court recognized the seriousness of these
types of crimes and their threat to public safety. In his specially concurring opinion,
Judge Cornish acknowledged the legislature's intent to protect the public from older
juveniles who commit the most violent crimes; to separate older, predatory juveniles
from younger, less criminally sophisticated children; and to validate the community's
outrage over serious crime and the public's demand for criminal prosecution.'
The 1979 legislature rewrote the reverse certification statutes."' This second
version of reverse certification passed constitutional muster when the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the revision in State ex rel. Coats v.
Rakestraw.21' In upholding the statute, the court rejected attacks based on
vagueness, equal protection, and due process." The court further noted the
legislature's intent that most sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds charged with any of
the enumerated felonies should be tried as adults.2"3 Although the accused can
apply to the juvenile division for "reverse certification" back to the juvenile division,
the court approved the legislature's intent that, in most instances, the magistrate
should decline to certify the accused as a "child.
2 4
207. The original eleven crimes were: (1) murder, (2) kidnapping for purposes of extortion, (3)
robbery with a dangerous'weapon, (4) rape in the second degree, (5) use of a firearm or other offensive
weapon while committing a felony, (6) arson in the first degree, (7) burglary in the first degree, (8)
burglary with explosives, (9) shooting with intent to kill, (10) manslaughter, and (11) nonconsensual
sodomy. 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 231, § I(A).
208. State ex reL Coats v. Johnson, 597 P.2d 328 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979).
209. Id. at 331 (Cornish, P.J., specially concurring).
210. 1979 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 257, §§ 1-9.
211. 610 P.2d 256 (Okia. Crim. App. 1980).
212. Id. at 258-60.
213. Id. at 258. Over the years, the legislature had added crimes to the reverse certification list.
Today, the complete list includes: (1) murder, (2) kidnapping; (3) robbery with a dangerous weapon; (4)
rape in the first degree; (5) rape by instrumentation; (6) use of a firearm or other offensive weapon while
committing a felony; (7) arson in the first degree; (8) burglary with explosives; (9) burglary in the first
or second degree after three or more adjudications for committing either burglary in the first degree or
burglary in the second degree; (10) shooting with intent to kill; (11) discharging a firearm, crossbow or
other weapon from a vehicle under 21 OKLA. STAT. 652 (B) (i.e., drive-by shooting); (12) witness
intimidation; (13) manslaught.r in the first degree; (14) nonconsensual sodomy; (15) and manufacturing,
distributing, dispensing or pc.ssessing with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense a controlled
dangerous substance (i.e., drug dealing). 10 OKA. STAT. § 1104.2(A) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
214. Rakestraw, 610 P.2d at 258. At footnote 2, the Court listed statutes from sister states that
require adult treatment for juveniles of certain age and offense classification, including Louisiana, New
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Florida, and the District of Columbia. Id.
(Vol. 46:655
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol46/iss4/4
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A JUDGE'S VIEW
Today's reverse certification procedure is as follows. First, the district attorney
files an information against the accused in the district court's criminal division,15
and the magistrate issues a warrant. The warrant and a certified copy of the
information must be served personally on the accused and the custodial parent 16
The warrant must state the rights of the accused and the parents: (1) to be present
at the preliminary hearing; (2) to have an attorney present; and (3) the right to apply
for "reverse certification" as a "child" to the district court's juvenile division.17
The accused then files a reverse-certification motion before the start of the criminal
preliminary hearing. 18
The magistrate then conducts the criminal preliminary hearing.1 9 The State first
presents its case, followed by the accused's presentation of his or her evidence for
reverse certification. The magistrate must rule on the reverse-certification motion
before deciding whether to bind the accused over for adult criminal trial. When
ruling on the reverse-certification motion, the magistrate must consider four
statutory guidelines, listed in order of importance:
1. Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner;
2. Whether the offense was against persons or property, greater
weight being given for retaining the accused person with the adult
criminal system for offenses against persons, especially if personal
injury resulted;
3. The record and past history of the accused person, including
previous contacts with law enforcement agencies and juvenile or
criminal courts, prior periods of probation and commitments to juvenile
institutions; and
4. The prospects for adequate protection of the public if the accused
person is processed through the juvenile system'm
Conspicuous by its absence from this list is the notion of amenability to
treatment. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has held that amenability is
not one of the criteria."' Therefore, its only possible relevance arises in the fourth
215. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1104.2(B) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
216. Id.
217. Failure to give the required notice may result in the accused escaping punishment. See Gilley
v. State, 64 OKLA. B.J. 665 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (remanding for a Hearing on Reverse Certification).
218. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1104.2(C) (1991 & Supp. 1993). Placing this burden on the accused does
not violate the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecutor still has the burden of proving
every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones v. State, 654 P.2d 1080, 1082
(Okla. Crim. App. 1992). At the start of the criminal preliminary hearing, the accused's complete juvenile
record is made available to both the district attorney and the accused. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1104.2(C) (1991
& Supp. 1993).
219. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1104.2(C) (1991 & Supp. 1993). The legislature intended this preliminary
hearing to be the preliminary examination required by 22 OKLA. STAT. §§ 251-276 (1991) and OKLA.
CONsT. art. 2, sec. 17; see also W.D.C. v. State, 799 P.2d 142, 144 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990).
220. 10 OKLA. STAT. § 1104.2(C) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
221. Armer v. State, 773 P.2d 757, 758 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
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factor concerning adequate protection of the public.' " This is a clear rejection of
the Juvenile Code's usual social welfare philosophy in favor of the public's right to
protection from violent criminals.'
The magistrate then enters an order concerning reverse certification, which is final
and appealable when entered.' If the magistrate grants the reverse-certification
motion, the accused is certified as a child and transferred to the district court's
juvenile division. The child's criminal record is then hidden from public view.2
IV. The Justice Model
It is time to move beyond the Juvenile Code. Well-meaning social welfare
advocates, with their zeal for rehabilitation, have lost their balance. They ignore
equally important functions of the law, including public condemnation for the crime,
punishing the criminal for the crime, retribution, incapacitation, and deterrence.
Their error is due to a lack of understanding of the law. As Professor Wigmore
noted more than half a century ago:
[T]he social wcrkers and the psychologists know nothing of crime or
wrong....
And so we say to the devoted social workers and the cold scientists:
"Do not think that you have a right to demand that all crimes be handed
over to your charge until you have looked a little more deeply into the
criminal law and have a better comprehension of the whole of its func-
tions."
Oklahoma should therefore adopt a justice model." 7 All juveniles accused of
crimes should begin in the adult criminal system, entitled to all of the criminal
rights of adults through trial. This phase would be the guilt/innocent determination.
If the juvenile is innocent, the case is over. But if the juvenile is guilty, then there
would be a sentencing phase. The sentencing judge would have the full range of
punishments and rehabilitation available in both the current adult and juvenile
systems. Handled in this way, the juvenile's sentence would more closely fit the
crime.
This does not mean that every juvenile offender is bound for prison. As no state
has the financial resources to lock up every juvenile offender, incarceration must be
222. Id. at 758-59; see also J.L.S. v. State, 759 P.2d 239, 240 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
223. Although the statute does not require the magistrate to detail responses to each guideline, the
magistrate should state reasons with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful appellate review. State
ex rel. Coats v. Rakestraw, 510 P.2d 256, 261 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980).
224. 10 OK.A. STAT. § 1104.2(E) (1991 & Supp. 1993).
225. Id. § 1104.2(D).
226. John H. Wigmore, Juvenile Court Vs. Criminal Court, 21 ILL. L. REV. 375, 376-77 (1926)
(Editorial Notes).
227. The author makes no claim for originating the justice model. The model has been suggested
by others, including Justice Marian P. Opala of the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Justice Marian P. Opala,
Address at the Oklahoma Joint Judicial Training Conference on Juvenile Justice (Nov. 9, 1992).
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considered a precious and limited resource, reserved for predators. Indeed, the full
range of options available in the adult system should be considered for juveniles.
For example, prosecutors should be able, where appropriate, to consider deferred
prosecution. The court, where appropriate, should consider deferred judgment and
sentence.
For example, probation is working well in the case of a young girl who shot her
abusive father. The girl pled guilty to first-degree manslaughter, and apparently
received a deferred judgment and sentence. If she abides by the conditions of her
probation, her record will be cleared in 1998.m
In a similar case that also drew national attention, two young boys plead no
contest to a manslaughter charge for shooting their abusive father. 9 Under such
circumstances, the Justice Model would include a battered child defense, resembling
the battered spouse defense recently adopted by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals.'
Overall, the Justice Model would determine guilt or innocence under constitution-
al standards. At the same time, predators would be incarcerated and non-predators
rehabilitated, providing the public with a greater degree of protection.
V. Recommendations for Change
However, if Oklahoma retains the Juvenile Code, the following changes should
be made:
(1) All records and court proceedings should be open to the public. Secrecy does
not protect children. All secrecy laws, including sections 1102 (E), 1104.2 (D),
1111 (A) (1), 1116.4, 1123.1, 1125.1, and 1125.3 should be repealed. The public
has the right to know what its government is doing.
(2) Change the definition of a "child" under section 1101. All persons sixteen and
older should be considered adults accountable for their crimes. Those under sixteen
should face reverse certification for all crimes.
(3) The presumption of releasability found at section 1107.1 should be deleted.
The bail procedure used for adults should be followed.
(4) The legislature must provide sufficient secure detention beds to hold danger-
ous juveniles for trial.
(5) The mandatory release after 90 days pretrial detention should be deleted. The
length of pretrial detention should be based on the facts and circumstances of the
individual case.
(6) Section 1109 should be deleted, and replaced with an explicit adoption of the
Miranda warnings. Those warnings should apply only where there is police
228. Mark A. Hutchison, Guilty Plea Ends Teen's Ordeal: Probation Given in Father's Death,
DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Feb. 24, 1993, at 1.
229. Mich Hinton & Mark A. Hutchison, Dutton Boys Adjust, Guardian Says, SUNDAY
OKLAHOMAN, Sept. 19, 1993, § A, at 11.
230. Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d I (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); see also Davenport v. State, 806 P.2d
655 (Okla. Crim. App. 1991) (adopting limited use of the child sex abuse accommodation syndrome).
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custodial interrogation. Section 1109 unfairly restricts questioning of children and
impedes the search for truth.
(7) The statutory right to trial by jury found at section 1110 should be strength-
ened by once again adding it to the Oklahoma Constitution. No person should be
convicted of any crime without the right to demand a jury. The jury provides a
wonderful check and balance against all forms of governmental tyranny.
(8) Greater importince should be placed on victim's rights. The Oklahoma
legislature's 1993 amendment to section 1111 (A)(1), granting crime victims the
right to attend juvenile hearings, is a step in the right direction. Greater priority
should be placed on the needs of the victim.
(9) Section 1112 (C) should be amended to eliminate the duplication caused by
holding both a prosecutive merit hearing and an adult preliminary hearing. The two
hearings should be combined into one.
(10) Preliminary inquiry should be changed. Currently, it sends the message that
a juvenile's first crime is free. The law should provide that a juvenile's first crime
will be punished.
(11) Section 1111 (A) should be amended to delete the requirement for separate
trials. The juvenile should be tried with his or her adult accomplices and co-
conspirators.
(12) Section 1116 should be changed to give judges the authority to sentence
juvenile criminals to confinement in a locked facility for a specific period of time.
Criminal punishment can and should be a part of the juvenile's rehabilitation.
Juveniles must know that they will be punished for their crimes. The legislature
should also add a provision to transfer the juvenile, when he or she turns eighteen,
to the Department of Corrections to complete the sentence.
(13) Section 1129 should be repealed. Legislative priority should be given to
public protection, victim compensation, and punishment for crime. Rehabilitation
is a worthy goal, but must be considered in the context of the other major goals.
Section 1129 should also delete the requirement for "least restrictive alternative."
Placement should be based on the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
(14) Section 1135, providing a legislative preference for own-home placement,
should be repealed.
(15) Section 1138 should be repealed. The placement goal should be public
protection.
(16) Section 1139 should be repealed. DHS should not decide whether a juvenile
is placed, or for how long. The court should make these decisions.
(17) If section 1139 is retained, it should be amended to provide that any juvenile
who fails to obey a ccurt order can be held in contempt and jailed, even if the
juvenile is under age eighteen.
(18) Executive branch authority over juvenile criminals should be transferred
from the DHS to the Department of Corrections.
(19) The Department of Corrections' primary objectives should be to protect the
public, punish criminal,;, and, if possible, rehabilitate the criminal.
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(20) Probation and parole violators should be arrested and detained in jail
(eligible for bail) until their initial court appearance. The initial court appearance
should be held the very next judicial day.
(21) The uncertainty and confusion surrounding the Terry D. case must be
resolved.
(22) The Juvenile Code's Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offender Act, found at
10 Okla. Stat. §§ 1160.1-1160.6, while well intended, is not sufficient. It should be
replaced with a justice model.
Although the above changes would not be as beneficial as a justice model, they
would cause a significant improvement in Oklahoma's present Juvenile Code.
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